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Abstract 
In this paper, I examine the mechanism of extremely high executive compensation based 
on the concept of ranking value and preference, and show that the origin of such 
extremely high compensation is economic rents. Ranking value and preference provide 
monopoly powers, profits, and rents to producers and generate “superstars” who are not 
only absolutely but, more importantly, are relatively superior to other executives. 
Furthermore, ranking value and preference enable a firm’s product to be differentiated 
and provide the firm monopoly rents (profits). Executives who contribute to 
differentiating the product can obtain economic rents and be compensated similar to 
superstars on professional sports teams. The monopoly rents owing to ranking values can 
be socially justified, but they may not be socially justifiable if they are solely distributed 
to executives.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Compensations for corporate executives are high—extremely high in some cases. In 
economics, wages are thought to be determined basically by productivities. A simple and 
naïve interpretation of this theory is that extremely high executive compensation indicates 
extremely high productivity compared with that of ordinary workers. However, it is 
highly likely that the absolute abilities of executives are not as high as the levels of 
compensation suggest. For example, their memories are not a hundred or a thousand times 
larger than those of ordinary workers. Rather, their abilities are “relatively” higher than 
ordinary workers. Executive compensation has often been regarded as being determined 
differently from the usual wage determination mechanism.  
 Many explanations of the mechanism of executive compensation have been 
presented (cf. Murphy, 2013), and several researchers have attempted to classify them 
(e.g., Otten, 2008; Edmans et al., 2017). Otten (2008) classified them into three 
categories: the value approach (e.g., Roberts, 1956; Prendergast, 1999; Combs and Skill, 
2003), the agency approach (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Barkema et al., 1997), and 
the symbolic approach (e.g., Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Davis et al., 1997). The value 
approach includes the explanation that executive compensation is determined by 
differences in accumulated human capital. The agency approach includes the explanation 
that the determination of executive compensation is an example of the agency-principal 
problem. The symbolic approach indicates that executive compensation reflects socially 
constructed symbols, for example, the status or role that executives play in a society or 
firm. Edmans et al. (2017) classified the explanations into three different categories: the 
shareholder value view (e.g., Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Terviö, 2008), the rent extraction 
view (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003), and the 
institutional influence view (e.g., Perry and Zenner, 2001). The shareholder value view 
indicates that executive compensations are the outcome of a firm’s behavior that 
maximizes shareholders’ objectives. The rent extraction view indicates that executive 
compensations are determined by the executives themselves. The institutional influence 
view indicates that executive compensations are substantially subject to legal and 
institutional constraints and practices.  
 Many of these explanations seem to commonly assume that some agents (e.g., 
shareholders, households, ordinary employees) are foolish, incompetent, or irrational, and 
that because of these properties a few executives can enjoy extremely high compensations. 
For example, in the agency approach, shareholders are very incompetent in monitoring 
executives’ efforts and therefore have to provide extremely high compensations for the 
executives to make sufficient efforts. In explanations based on human capital, 
shareholders cannot replace the executive with an employee other than the executive 
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because other employees are significantly less competent than the executive, and thereby 
the executive possesses very strong bargaining power. These explanations maybe be true 
to some extent, but they seem insufficient because it is highly likely that shareholders, 
households, and ordinary employees are not significantly foolish, incompetent, or 
irrational.   
 What amplifies the moderate difference in absolute abilities between executives 
and other workers to the extremely large difference in compensations between them? It 
is highly likely that some kinds of economic rent contribute to executive compensations, 
because the payments cannot be fully explained by the executives’ productivities, but 
what kind of economic rent? In this paper, this question is examined on the basis of the 
concept of ranking value and preference, as shown by Harashima (2016, 2017, 2018a, 
2018b). Ranking value and preference generate monopoly powers, profits, and rents. 
People have ranking preference because ranking is an important element in people’s lives 
and economic activities, and ranking preference is deeply rooted in the process of 
evolution of human beings, who have dominance hierarchies (cf. Landau, 1951; Bayly et 
al., 2006). Therefore, goods and services have ranking values in addition to practical 
values, and some of them have extremely high ranking values. An important point is that 
ranking value and preference provide monopoly powers, profits, and rents to the 
producers of products that have high ranking values, and ranking values are generated not 
by absolute, but by relative, superiority among goods or services within the same category. 
For example, in professional sports, even though a player’s absolute ability is not so 
different from that of the other players, the player can be a superstar if the player’s ability 
is higher—even if only by a little— than those of the other players. Harashima (2018a) 
showed that superstars can be generated not only in individual sports but also in team 
sports. In addition, Harashima (2017) showed that, because of ranking value and 
preference, products can be differentiated, and differentiated products provide firms with 
monopoly powers, profits, and rents.  
 Combining these concepts of ranking value and preference, in this paper, I show 
that the mechanism that produces extremely high executive compensation is the same as 
that of superstars in team sports, and the origin of extremely high executive compensation 
lies in people’s ranking preference. The important point here is that it is not the absolute, 
but rather the relative, abilities of executives (i.e., ranks) that determine compensation. 
Executives can be compensated like superstars if they can successfully differentiate the 
firm’s products and provide monopoly power, profits, and rents to the firm with a 
relatively higher probability than other executives and workers. The monopoly rents 
owing to ranking values can be socially justified, but it does not seem to be justifiable 
that these monopoly rents are distributed solely to executives, because the households’ 
utilities derived from ranking values are not affected by the executives’ efforts. Therefore, 
measures that reduce economic inequality may need to be prioritized when society 
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considers the distribution of these types of monopoly rents. 
 
2  RANKING VALUE AND PREFERENCE 
 
In this section, the concept of ranking value and preference shown by Harashima (2016, 
2017, 2018a, 2018b) is explained in brief.  
 
2.1  Ranking value 
Value is regarded as reflecting something useful. People feel, obtain, or consume value 
when using, enjoying, or consuming goods and services. Values derived from practical 
use have usually been considered in economics, but people will also consume values 
derived from ranking. For example, if a curio is evaluated to be the best among a set of 
similar types of curios, its price will become very high relative to those of the others, 
regardless of whether it is practically useful. Its price is so high only because it is the top-
ranked item in the group. In this sense, people obtain utility not only from practical uses 
but also from a sense of ranking. 
 Therefore, value has two components: practical value and ranking value. 
Practical value is the value that people feel when consuming a good or service for 
practical purposes. Ranking value is the value that people feel from the rank of a good or 
service in a set of similar types of goods or services that people use, possess, or observe 
(e.g., the ranking of a book in a best-seller list or that of a professional baseball team in a 
league).  
 
2.2  Ranking preference 
Suppose that goods and services have the following properties: quantity, quality, and rank. 
Quality is related to practical value, rank is related to ranking value, and quantity is related 
to both values. Suppose also that the quality and rank of each good or service are given 
exogenously and fixed. Here, for simplicity, I assume that there is only one type of good 
or service in the economy, and that all goods or services belong to this type (these goods 
or services are hereafter called “goods” for simplicity) and are substitutable for each other 
for households’ practical uses. Although the goods are substitutable from the point of 
view of practical uses, they are differentiated from the point of view of rank. 
 Let R (= 1, 2, 3, …) be the rank of the goods. The good with rank R = 1 is most 
preferred by households, rank R = 2 is the next most preferred, and so on. For simplicity, 
it is assumed that there is no tied rank. A household’s utility derived from consuming 
goods with rank R is  
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𝑢(𝑞𝑛,𝑅 , 𝑞𝑙,𝑅 , 𝑅), 
 
where qn,R and ql,R are the quantity and quality of the good with rank R, respectively. For 
simplicity, the utility of the household is modified to  
 
𝑢(?̃?𝑅 , 𝑅) , 
 
where
Rq
~ is the “quality-adjusted quantity” of the good with rank R, and
l,Rn,RR qqq 
~ .  
 The utility function has the following conventional characteristics: 
 
𝜕𝑢(?̃?𝑅 , 𝑅)
𝜕?̃?𝑅
> 0 
 
and 
 
𝜕2𝑢(?̃?𝑅 , 𝑅)
𝜕?̃?𝑅
2 < 0 . 
 
In addition, for any Rr ,  
 
𝑢(?̃?𝑟 , 𝑟 + 1) < 𝑢(?̃?𝑟 , 𝑟) 
 
and 
 
𝑢(?̃?𝑟 , 𝑟 + 2) − 𝑢(?̃?𝑟 , 𝑟 + 1) > 𝑢(?̃?𝑟 , 𝑟 + 1) − 𝑢(?̃?𝑟 , 𝑟) . 
 
2.3  Implicit ranking 
Although some goods and services have explicit rankings, most goods and services do 
not, because there is no open competition for them. However, it is highly likely that 
people still feel a sense of ranking, possibly unconsciously, from many goods and services 
because they usually want to know which products most people are paying attention to, 
and they want to buy the products that are the most popular and well known. Fame is 
valuable because it provides information about “implicit rankings” and generates a sense 
of ranking. Even if there is no explicit ranking of products, households want to know their 
implicit rankings by any means and are alert to every chance of obtaining the information 
about which product is more preferred and sold quantitatively in the market. Because 
implicit rankings are essentially formed on the basis of information about which product 
is more preferred and sold quantitatively, they are not an individual household’s unique 
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and personal rankings; rather, they are socially and widely recognized rankings. That is, 
the implicit rankings will be basically common knowledge of households.  
 
3  SUPERSTAR 
 
3.1  A superstar model  
3.1.1  Monopoly power and superstars  
Ranking value and preference bring monopoly powers, profits, and rents to the producers 
of high-rank products, because selling ranking values to consumers requires no additional 
cost; that is, the marginal cost of producing a ranking value is zero. Therefore, producers 
of highly ranked products can set prices that are above their marginal costs (see 
Harashima, 2016, 2017, 2018b). If households’ ranking preference is strong enough, 
therefore, the highest-rank producer can be a superstar.  
 
3.1.2  Superstars in team sports 
In team sports, teams—not individuals—compete, and championships are likewise won 
by the team, not by any individual player. Why then do individual superstars clearly exist 
in team sports? Harashima (2018a) showed the mechanism of generation of superstars in 
team sports. The origin of the extremely high compensation of superstars in team sports 
is also ranking value and preference. The mechanism is explained in brief in this section.  
 
3.1.2.1  The probability of a win  
Suppose that there are M teams and P players, and each team equally consists of n players 
such that P = nM. The probability that a rank r ( P ) player belongs to a rank m ( M ) 
team is identical for any m and r. The ability of a team is the sum of the abilities of all 
players who belong to the team, and the probability of a team winning is higher if the 
total ability of the team is higher than that of its opponent. As mentioned above, each 
team consists of n players, but there are many possible combinations of n players on a 
team. Suppose that the number of possible combinations in which a rank r player is 
included as one of n players on a team is Λ. A natural number is assigned to each of Λ 
possible combinations in order from 1 to Λ.  
 Let
ra
~ be the expected ability of a team to which a rank r player belongs, and
r,λa
be the ability of team when the assigned number of combinations is λ ( Λ ). Because all 
of the combinations have the same probability of being realized, 
ra
~ is calculated by the 
simple average of
r,λa such that 
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?̃?𝑟 = 𝛬
−1 ∑ 𝑎𝑟,𝜆
𝛬
𝜆=1
 . 
 
Because of the nature of
ra
~ ,  
 
211
~~~~
  rrrr aaaa                           (1) 
 
for any r (see Harashima, 2018a). Inequality (1) indicates that
ra
~ can be approximated by 
an exponentially increasing function of P – r; that is, 
ra
~ increases exponentially as the 
rank of a player rises.  
 Because a win or loss is determined basically by the relative differences in the 
teams’ abilities, the probability of a win for a team to which a rank r player belongs can 
be also approximated by an exponentially increasing function of P – r. In addition, 
because a team’s revenue to which a rank r player belongs (Ωr) is basically determined 
by the probability of a win, Ωr can be also approximated by an exponentially increasing 
function of P – r. 
 Because even a slight difference in teams’ abilities can be decisive in 
determining a win or loss, even a small relative difference between teams’ abilities will 
result in a large difference in probabilities of a win. As a result, team revenue (Ωr) will 
increase more sharply than players’ abilities (ar) do as r decreases from R to 1.   
 
3.1.2.2  Mechanism of generation of superstars in team sports 
The ability of a rank r player is assumed to be    
 
𝑎𝑟 = exp[𝛼(𝑃 − 𝑟)] ,                           (2) 
 
where α (> 0) is a parameter and aP = 1; that is, the ability of the rank P (the lowest 
ranked) player is normalized to be unity. Because of the nature of Ωr, the salary of a rank 
r player (zr) is  
 
 PPrr ΩzΩz   
 
(see Harashima, 2018a). Therefore, the salary of a rank r player can be modeled as   
 
𝑧𝑟 = (𝑧𝑅 − 𝛿) + 𝛿exp[𝛼𝛽(𝑃 − 𝑟)]  ,               (3) 
 
where β (> 1) and δ (> 0) are parameters. 
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 Both ability (ar) and salary (zr) increase exponentially from the bottom to the top 
player, but an increase in the player’s ability is greatly amplified in the corresponding 
increase in the player’s salary. Therefore, even if the differences in players’ abilities are 
small, differences in their salaries can be very large. A few top players can obtain 
extremely large salaries as compared with those of many other players.  
 
4  PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 
 
4.1  Monopoly rents derived from product differentiation 
The importance of product differentiation has been emphasized in the study of business 
administration. The differentiation strategy is one of the three fundamental strategies in 
Porter’s generic strategies (Porter, 1980, 1985). Product differentiation is important 
because it provides monopoly powers, profits, and rents to firms. Harashima (2017) 
showed that these monopoly powers, profits, and rents originate in household ranking 
preferences. The model of product differentiation shown by Harashima (2017) is 
explained in brief in this section.  
 
4.1.1  Model of product differentiation 
4.1.1.1  Household choice  
Suppose that there are two products (Product 1 and Product 2) that are purchased by 
households for an identical practical use, and each of them is produced by one of two 
competing firms (Firm 1 and Firm 2); that is, Firm 1 and Firm 2 produce Product 1 and 
Product 2, respectively. A household purchases only one of the two products. Before 
purchasing it, a household compares the products and judges which one is better (i.e., 
which is the “winner”). A household evaluates the difference between the two products 
by awarding “points” to a product for each of various aspects and uses a weighted sum of 
the points awarded to each product to determine the winner (i.e., the one with more points). 
Finally, the household purchases the winner. 
 
4.1.1.2  The model 
Points for quality and taste are given by real numbers, but those for rank are given by 
natural numbers. Let qi (i = 1, 2, …, Q) be points given by a household for a product with 
regard to aspect i of quality where there are a total of Q aspects. Let ti (j = 1, 2, … , T) be 
points awarded by a household for a product with regard to aspect j of taste, where there 
are a total of T aspects. Suppose for simplicity that points given by households for any 
aspect of taste are uniformly distributed over a finite interval following the model of 
Hotelling (1929). Let RP be points given by a household for a product with regard to rank. 
RP = 1 indicates the highest rank and RP = 2 is the second. Unlike qi and ti, RP for each 
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product is common across households because RP is a socially recognized rank. If an 
implicit ranking has not yet been formed socially, RP = 0 for any product and household. 
Finally, let Π be the price of a unit of product and be commonly known to all households. 
 The total number of points awarded by a household to a product is 
 
?̃? = 𝛱−1 (𝑤𝑞 ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑄
𝑖=1
+ 𝑤𝑡 ∑ 𝑡𝑗
𝑇
𝑗=1
+ 𝑤𝑅𝑅𝑃)   ,              (4)  
 
where wq, wt, and wR are constant weights. A household purchases the product that has 
the larger T
~
. Suppose also for simplicity that Π is identical for the two products and 
equals 1. A household calculates equation (4) for both products and purchases the product 
with the higher T
~
value.  
 The total points given by households to Product v (v = 1, 2) are assumed to be 
uniformly distributed between the interval from 1vT to 1vT for any v, where Tv is the 
mean of total points given by households to Product v. Let
vT
~
be the total points awarded 
by an individual household to Product v. The probability that a household judges that the 
total of the points given by it on Product 1 (
1
~
T ) is higher than that on Product 2 ( 2
~
T ) is 
 
      44
8
1~~
21
2
2121  TTTTTTp  , 
 
where   1~~ 21 TTp if 221 TT (see Harashima, 2017).  
 
4.1.1.3  The decisive role of rank in households’ choices 
Because ranks are intrinsically discrete, there is a lower limit of difference between 
different ranks (i.e., 1), and thereby there is also a lower limit of difference between wRRP 
for adjacent ranks (i.e., wR). On the other hand, there is no lower limit of the difference 
between adjacent points for quality or taste because they are represented by real numbers, 
and there is no lower limit of the difference between adjacent values of 𝑤𝑞 ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑄
𝑖=1  or 
𝑤𝑡 ∑ 𝑡𝑗
𝑇
𝑗=1 . Therefore, it is the implicit ranking that usually differentiates competing 
products (see Harashima, 2017).  
 Let
1,2, PPP RRR  , where RP, 1 and RP, 2 are the RP of Products 1 and 2, 
respectively, and
2,1, PP RR  ( 2,1, PP RR  only if 02,1,  PP RR ) and thereby 0PR . 
Because of the natures of quality, taste, and rank, usually 
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   
8
4
1
~~
2
21
RR
P
ww
RTTp

             ,       (5) 
 
(see Harashima, 2017). Equation (5) indicates that product differentiation is usually 
governed by the strength of households’ ranking preferences.  
 
4.1.1.4  Monopoly rents 
By equation (5), Firm 1 obtains monopoly power. In the previous sections, it is assumed 
that Π = 1 for both products. However, Firm 1 can set the price of Product 1 higher than 
that of Product 2 because of its monopoly power. Because the marginal costs of producing 
Products 1 and 2 will be almost identical, Firm 1 can set the price of Product 1 higher 
than its marginal cost as well higher than the price of Product 2. Therefore, Firm 1 can 
exploit monopoly rents through product differentiation.  
 
4.2  Way to obtain higher implicit product rank  
Because high implicit ranks of products provide large amounts of monopoly rents to firms, 
obtaining a higher rank is essential for a firm to prosper. However, because there are many 
competing firms it will not necessarily be easy for a firm to gain a higher implicit product 
rank. Technological superiority over rival firms will be important for a firm to 
successfully differentiate its products from those of rival firms, but the level of technology 
will not usually differ greatly among competing firms because they would otherwise stop 
competing. If technologies are almost equal among competing firms, the ability of 
employees—particularly executives—of a firm will be significantly important as the 
factor that differentiates a firm’s products and allows them to obtain higher implicit ranks.  
 Because the abilities of workers will certainly be heterogeneous even if the 
differences are small, the average ability of employees in a firm will be also 
heterogeneous across firms. If the employees’ average ability in a firm is higher than 
those in rival firms, the probability that the implicit rank of the firm’s product is higher 
than those of rival firms will also be higher. In particular, if a firm’s executives’ average 
ability is higher than that of the rival firms, the probability of a higher implicit ranking 
will also be higher.  
 
5  EXECUTIVES AS SUPERSTARS  
 
5.1  Resemblance between monopoly rents of teams and firms  
Sections 3 and 4 indicate that the monopoly rents of professional sport teams and those 
of firms that successfully differentiate their products commonly originate in ranking value 
and preference. In addition, teams and firms share the common feature that, to obtain a 
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higher rank, it is essential to hire more talented employees—in particular, players or 
executives. In these respects, a team and a firm can be seen as the same kind of economic 
agent or organization in that they are the beneficiaries of households’ ranking preferences. 
In addition, a player and an executive can be seen as a similar type of economic agent. 
Therefore, it is highly likely that the mechanism of executive compensation is the same 
as that for players’ salaries in team sports. This means that some executives can be 
compensated like superstars in team sports.  
 Note that firms can also enjoy monopoly rents that are not attributed to ranking 
value and preference—for example, through a natural monopoly or patents. However, 
because the sources of the monopoly rents in those cases are not household ranking 
preference, the salary mechanism described here will not necessarily work in those firms. 
 
5.2  Abilities relevant to superstars in firms  
5.2.1  Tasks, duties, and abilities of employees  
There are many different kinds of tasks and duties in business. However, in this paper, 
the focus is only on those that contribute to making the implicit ranks of products higher. 
Although any task or duty may contribute, or be related directly or indirectly, to making 
implicit ranks higher to a greater or lesser extent, examples of those that contribute mainly 
to higher ranks and the resulting monopoly rents are:  
 
 correctly expect the households’ average weights (wq,i, wR, and wt,j) 
 correctly anticipate relevant actions of rival firms 
 achieve and maintain a higher intrinsic product quality than rival firms’ 
 continuously generate more relevant innovations than rival firms’ 
 influence households’ perception of the implicit ranks (e.g., by advertising). 
 
In the following discussion, the “ability” of workers includes only the ability to 
implement these tasks and duties and increase the implicit ranks of products.  
 Some workers (including executives) have high levels of ability and others have 
lower levels; ability thus differs across workers. In addition, these differences can be 
measured by the degree of contribution to monopoly rents. Hence, in this paper, the ability 
of workers is assumed to be cardinally measurable.  
 
5.2.2  The property of employees’ abilities  
Employee ability can be divided to two types: 
 
(1) ability to accomplish one of many subdivided and separated tasks and duties that 
contribute to making implicit ranks higher, and 
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(2) ability to coordinate and allocate employees who have different kinds of type (1) 
abilities within a firm.   
 
Type (1) ability is required for ordinary employees and type (2) ability is required for 
executives. For a mid-level manager a mix of the two types is required, but executives 
and ordinary employees will also have some mix of type (1) and (2) abilities. Therefore, 
the ability of each employee, including executives, is the weighted sum of type (1) and 
(2) abilities, although ordinary employees will typically have mostly type (1) abilities and 
executives will typically have mostly type (2) abilities. 
 As noted in Section 5.2.1, ability is assumed to be cardinally measurable, and 
therefore all workers (including executives) in an economy can be ranked by ability. For 
simplicity, it is assumed that ability is unchangeable and there are no tied ranks. The 
greater the ability of a worker is, the higher the rank. (Note that a higher rank has a lower 
number; i.e., rank 1 is higher than rank 2.) It is highly likely that executives will be 
included in the top tier of workers, because type (2) abilities will receive a greater weight 
than type (1) abilities. Therefore, the top-ranked set will consist mostly of executives. 
 In addition, it is highly likely that the abilities of executives will exponentially 
increase as the rank increases, because abilities of people in general will approximately 
follow a normal distribution, and workers in the top group (mostly executives) will 
correspond to the tail of the ability distribution. Therefore, as with players in team sports, 
the abilities of executives will approximately increase exponentially from the lowest 
ability executive to the highest, even though the differences will be small because of the 
upper limit of human ability.  
 
5.3  Promotion from within and hiring from outside 
As shown in Section 5.1, executives and players can be treated as the same kind of 
economic agent, but they have some different properties. The probability that a higher 
rank position is filled by promoting a lower rank employee from within a firm (or team) 
rather than hiring a person from outside the firm (team) will be higher in the case of 
executives than in the case of players. The importance of firm (team)-specific human 
capital (skills and knowledge that are useful only within a specific firm or team) most 
likely differs for executives and players. Before being able to fully demonstrate their 
abilities, executives and players have to accumulate firm (team)-specific human capital. 
Because accumulating human capital takes time and incurs costs, the mobility of 
executives and players will be constrained to some extent. If the amount of firm (team)-
specific human capital to be accumulated is relatively larger in one firm (team), it would 
be relatively more difficult for outside talents to become employed with that firm or team. 
In addition, it is also relatively more difficult for workers inside a firm (team) to move to 
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other firms (teams), because it is likely that workers who accumulate a large amount of 
firm (team)-specific human capital may not accumulate a sufficient amount of more 
general human capital; that is, the human capital that they have accumulated is specific 
to one firm (team). 
 It is likely that the amounts of firm (team)-specific human capital that executives 
have to accumulate are far larger than those that players in team sports have to accumulate, 
and therefore that the mobility of executives is more constrained than players. For 
example, a baseball pitcher versus a CEO. This means that the mobility of executives 
across firms is more constrained than that of players. Nevertheless, firms can recruit 
executives from outside and executives can change firms and, in actuality, many 
executives have been hired from outside a given firm.  
 If mobility is constrained, executives and players cannot necessarily obtain all 
of the monopoly rents, unlike in the case of perfect mobility, because constrained mobility 
indicates an imperfect market for executives or players. For example, even if an executive 
demands the high level of compensation that could be obtained if mobility were not 
constrained, a firm can reject this demand because it knows that the executive cannot 
easily move to other firms. The constrained mobility therefore acts to reduce the level of 
executive compensation. This means that a portion of the monopoly rents is distributed 
to other stakeholders—for example, stockholders or ordinary employees. How this 
portion is distributed among the stakeholders may be determined by the relative strengths 
of the bargaining powers of the stakeholders.  
 Note that there is another difference between executives and players. There are 
leagues/union rules (most notably salary caps) on players/teams but not for executives 
and firms. 
 
5.4  Executives as superstars in firms 
Sections 5.2 and 5.3 indicate that the compensations of executives and the salaries of 
players in team sports are basically governed by the same mechanism. Hence, a model of 
executive compensation can be constructed on the basis of the superstar model shown in 
Section 3.1.2. Suppose that there are P executives, and by the reason shown in Section 
5.2.2, suppose also that the ability of executives increases exponentially from the rank P 
executive to the rank 1 executive, such that  
 
𝑎𝑟 = exp[𝛼(𝑃 − 𝑟)]       ,                  (6) 
 
where r is executive rank, ar is the ability of the rank r executive, aP = 1, and α (> 0) is a 
parameter. By the same mechanism as shown in Section 3.1.2, the compensation of a rank 
r executive (zr) can be modeled by 
 13 
 
𝑧𝑟 = (𝑧𝑅 − 𝛿) + 𝛿exp[𝛼𝛽(𝑃 − 𝑟)] ,               (7) 
 
where β (> 1) and δ (> 0) are parameters. Equations (6) and (7) are identical to equations 
(2) and (3), respectively, and indicate that both ability (ar) and compensation (zr) increase 
exponentially from the bottom to the top executive. An important point is that an increase 
in an executive’s ability is amplified in the corresponding increase in that executive’s 
compensation. Therefore, a few top executives can obtain extremely high compensation, 
similar to superstars in team sports. 
 Even if the ability of the rank 1 executive is not so different from those of other 
executives, the rank 1 executive can get a far larger portion of the monopoly rents 
generated by households’ ranking preference than the other executives. The rank 2 
executive can also obtain a much larger compensation than those of executives lower than 
rank 2, but a far smaller compensation than the rank 1 executive. This is the reason for 
the extremely high compensation of some top executives. The rank 1 executive across the 
entire pool of executives can obtain the highest compensation in the case of perfect 
mobility.  
 
6  JUSTIFIABILITY 
 
Can extremely high executive compensations be justified even if their source is monopoly 
rents? Some monopoly rents (e.g., those derived by natural monopoly) are not socially 
justified and are usually regulated by the authorities, but others (e.g., those from patents) 
usually are justified. Whether monopoly rents are justifiable will depend on their effects 
on the economy and society. The basic question here is: Can monopoly rents attributed 
to households’ ranking preferences be justified? In addition, even if they can be socially 
justified, are uneven distributions of these monopoly rents, e.g., the distribution of most 
of these monopoly rents to executives, justified?   
 First, I examine whether the monopoly rents derived from ranking values 
themselves can be justified. As shown in Section 2, the utilities that households obtain 
from ranking values are in addition to the utilities they obtain from practical values. Hence, 
if an authority (i.e., the government) were to eliminate differentiated products by force, 
households would lose some amount of utility (that obtained from ranking value) without 
obtaining any additional utility from practical values. In this sense, regulating 
differentiated products by force is disadvantageous for households. Therefore, the 
monopoly rents derived from ranking values themselves can be justified. 
 Next, I examine who should obtain the monopoly rents derived from ranking 
values. In the case of patents, innovators can obtain monopoly rents exclusively for 
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defined periods because (1) people benefit from newly generated innovations and (2) 
motivation and incentive for innovators to generate innovations are significantly 
enhanced under this scheme. Hence, whether executives can obtain a large portion of the 
monopoly rents should be judged by whether people benefit by enhancing executives’ 
motivation and incentive. A household’s ranking preference is not related to the absolute 
abilities of executives; rather, it is related to their relative abilities. Some executive must 
be the top-ranked executive in any given period, even if that executive’s absolute ability 
is very low from a historical perspective. Conversely, the utilities households derive from 
ranking values are not affected by the historical level of absolute abilities of executives. 
Hence, even if the motivation of executives to work harder is enhanced through a high 
level of compensation, their enhanced efforts are irrelevant to the utilities that households 
eventually obtain from ranking values. Whether executives work harder or not, the 
amount of utility that households derive from ranking values does not change. Therefore, 
it is not necessarily justifiable to distribute a large portion of the monopoly rents owing 
to ranking values to executives. Note, however, that this does not mean that executives 
should not obtain any of the monopoly rents.  
 To whom should the monopoly rents be distributed? There are several 
possibilities: shareholders, ordinary employees, consumers, and executives. It appears to 
be difficult to judge who contributes to the generation of the monopoly rents and how 
much they contribute. The distribution of monopoly rents, therefore, may have to be 
evaluated from a different perspective—particularly that of inequality. The existence of 
extremely high incomes indicates the existence of extreme economic inequality. If 
extreme economic inequality is not socially supported, and if justifiable ownership of 
these monopoly rents cannot be determined, society may justifiably prioritize reducing 
this type of economic inequality, for example by imposing a high income tax rate on these 
monopoly rents. 
 
7  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Compensations for some corporate executives are extremely high, but it is difficult to 
explain this by their contribution to productivity. Therefore, many types of explanations 
of the mechanism of executive compensation have been presented. Many of these seem 
to commonly assume that some economic agents (e.g., shareholders, households, or 
ordinary employees) are foolish, incompetent, or irrational, but it seems highly likely that 
these agents are not significantly so.  
 At issue is the large discrepancy between differences in absolute abilities and 
those in levels of compensation. In this paper, this issue was examined on the basis of the 
concept of ranking value and preference shown by Harashima (2016, 2017, 2018a, 2018b). 
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It is highly likely that some kinds of economic rent underlie these high levels of 
compensation, because the payments cannot be fully explained by productivity. Ranking 
value and preference provide monopoly powers, profits, and rents to firms that produce 
the products that have high ranking values. Thanks to the monopoly powers, profits, and 
rents derived from people’s ranking preferences, superstars can be generated not only in 
individual, but also in team, professional sports (Harashima, 2016, 2018a, 2018b). In 
addition, products can be differentiated because of households’ ranking values and 
preferences, and differentiated products provide firms with monopoly powers, profits, 
and rents (Harashima, 2017). Therefore, executives and players in team sports are both 
beneficiaries of people’s ranking preferences. Executive compensations and player 
salaries are generated through commonly perceived ranks; that is, they are determined by 
the relative, not absolute, abilities of executives or players. Some executives therefore are 
similar to the superstars in team sports and receive high compensations by the same 
mechanism. 
 The monopoly rents owing to ranking values can be socially justified because 
the households’ utilities derived from ranking values are in addition to those derived from 
practical values. However, it does not seem to be justifiable that these monopoly rents are 
distributed solely to executives, because the households’ utilities derived from ranking 
values are not affected by the executives’ efforts. Therefore, measures that reduce 
economic inequality may need to be prioritized when society considers the distribution 
of these types of monopoly rents. 
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